Introduction

Bryan Tipp’s advice to “give the matter time,” coupled with his refusal to pursue or even explain available civil remedies, breached core duties of competence, diligence, and communication. The breach let the three-year Montana statute of limitations expire on every viable § 1983, defamation, IIED, and false-imprisonment claim arising from 2015-2018 incidents. Because those deadlines lapsed before Mr. Nuno understood his rights, most wrongdoers—police officers, prosecutors, YWCA employees, and private harassers—now enjoy practical immunity from suit.

I. Applicable Standards Governing Attorney Conduct

1. Competence & Diligence. Montana Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.1 and 1.3 require lawyers to provide “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary” and to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness” in representing a client[1].
2. Communication. MRPC 1.4 obligates an attorney to “keep the client reasonably informed” of material developments, including limitations periods and available causes of action[2].
3. Statute of Limitations for Civil Claims.
   • Legal-malpractice actions in Montana carry a three-year discovery period, and no claim may be filed more than ten years after the negligent act[3].
   • Federal § 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period—three years in both Montana and Washington[4][5].
   • Montana defamation, IIED, and false-imprisonment claims must likewise be filed within three years[6][7].

II. Timeline of Missed Civil Deadlines Caused by Counsel’s Inaction

Total direct economic loss from now-barred claims: \$6.4–8.4 million (see prior damages analysis).

III. Element-by-Element Malpractice Assessment

1. Duty. Tipp represented Mr. Nuno from 2017 through 2021, concededly owing fiduciary and professional duties under MRPC 1.1–1.4[1][2].
2. Breach.
   • Failure to Advise of Limitations Periods. Tipp never disclosed the three-year clock for § 1983 or Montana tort claims, violating Rule 1.4(a)(1)[2].
   • Negligent Case Assessment. He ignored objectively facial claims—false arrest, malicious prosecution, IIED—despite extensive records proving lack of probable cause.
   • Refusal to Act. He rebuffed repeated client requests to draft an advocacy letter to police or file civil pleadings, disregarding Rule 1.3’s diligence mandate[1].
   • Conflict of Interest Indicators. Tipp’s “generally disinclined” posture aligned with prosecutorial interests, suggesting an unmanaged Rule 1.7(a)(2) conflict.
3. Causation (“Case-within-a-Case”). In malpractice matters a lawyer’s negligence is actionable when it is a substantial factor in the loss of the underlying claim[8]. Here, Tipp’s omissions were the but-for cause of every SOL lapse; absent his breach, timely suits could have proceeded with high likelihood of success given police misconduct findings and dismissals of all criminal charges.
4. Damages.
   • Economic: $3.44 million documented losses (career income, contract terminations, legal and medical costs).
   • Litigation Value Lost: $6.4–8.4 million in potential compensatory and punitive recovery (see earlier Fourth and First Amendment assessments).
   • Non-Economic: Ongoing PTSD and reputational harm, now uncompensated because civil defendants can invoke limitations defenses.

IV. Why Tolling and Continuing-Violation Theories Now Fail

Tolling doctrines (fraudulent concealment, continuing violation) require diligent pursuit once a plaintiff knows or should know of the injury[9]. Tipp’s advice to “wait” deprived Mr. Nuno of the diligence necessary to preserve tolling arguments, and courts typically reject continuing-violation claims for discrete acts like arrests and defamatory filings[10]. Consequently, potential equitable relief is severely weakened—another direct outgrowth of counsel’s negligence.

V. Comparative Professional-Conduct Framework

Legal-ethics authorities hold that an attorney must disclose any circumstance “required to permit the client to make informed decisions” and must warn of malpractice if an error creates a viable claim[11]. Tipp did neither, masking his own malpractice risk and accelerating SOL expiration—conduct squarely contrary to the fiduciary duty of candor.

VI. Litigation Outlook Against Tipp